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KAHAN ON MISTAKES
Daniel Yeager*
In Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse - but Only for the Virtuous, 1
Professor Dan Kahan reconciles what I had thought was an irrecon
cilable body of law. To be sure, imposing order on whether and
when mistakes of law should pass as responsibility-evading accounts
of untoward actions is far from light work. Yet Kahan somehow
pulls it off in just twenty-seven pages.
In addition to acknowledging the importance of Professor
Kahan's essay, I write here to point out if not correct what might
have been two oversights in his view of the meaning and operation
of mistakes. First, Kahan never acknowledges that the "legal mor
alism" he endorses has long governed when mistakes of fact which bear at least a family resemblance to mistakes of law - can
excuse us from responsibility for what we have done. Second, the
real power and demands of Kahan's essay are only hinted at. While
the implication of his thesis - "that law is suffused with morality
and ... the making of moral judgments"2 - is profound, Kahan
stakes out no moral positions. This strikes me as a gap in a theory
that allows ignorance of law as an excuse only for those agents
whose "underlying conduct violates no moral norms independent of
the law that prohibits it."3 Kahan certainly is free to consign to
courts the task of establishing criteria for evaluating whether, for
example, possessing :firearms,4 failing to pay taxes,s illegally trans
porting wildlife,6 and failing to report campaign contributions7 are
matters of morality as well as of law. Still (and this may be more
personal than dialectical), I felt deprived by his refusal to answer
what, at least to my mind, had provided the occasion for his essay:
Is it moral to obey the law? Immoral to break it?
* Professor, California Western School of Law. A.B. 1979, Kenyon; J.D. 1989, University of Florida; LL.M. 1991, University of Illinois. - Ed.
1. 96 MlcH. L. REv. 127 (1997).
2. Kahan, supra note 1, at 128.
3. Id. at 149.
4. See id. at 141.
5. See id. at 146-49.
6. See id. at 149 n.89.
7. See id. at 149.
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Kahan's intention is to get to the bottom of both why "igno
rance of the law is no excuse," and why sometimes it is. The con
ventional position, which Kahan dubs "Holmesian," cannot
adequately explain either. The Holmesian position is based on a
sense of "liberal positivism," which presupposes - mistakenly in
Kahan's view - a disconnection between law and morality. In
other words, the Holmesian position holds, "even the bad man can
be a good citizen so long as he lives up to society's rules."8 One
need not be moral - one can "lack[ ] the values that would have
motivated·a good person to perceive the real value of things"9 -in
order to live a legally trouble-free life.10 Because the Holmesian
position "disclaims any reliance on the moral knowledge of citizens,
as well as any ambition to make them value morality for its own
sake,"11 it celebrates the "utility of legal knowledge."12 Since it is
merely law-abiding (not necessarily good, or right, or true, or just)
conduct that the law intends to inspire, the Holmesian position
"shows no mercy for those who claim to be ignorant of what the
criminal law proscribes."13 This, in turn, "maximizes citizens' in
centive to learn the rules that 'the law-maker has determined to
make men know and obey."'14
Kahan does a superb job of demonstrating that the Holmesian
position does a lousy job of backing up its belief in the virfoes of
legal research. "[I]f the goal is only to protect society from the le
gally stupid," Kahan argues, then the Holmesian position is in
verted.15 In a strict liability regime - one in which the but-I
thought-it-was-legal defense is always denied - there is no payoff
for legal research: break the law and go to jail, even after diligent
ex ante efforts to verify the lawfulness of an action. But in a negli
gence regime, Kahan concludes - one in which reasonable steps to
ascertain the law are rewarded - more legal research will occur
because mistaken researchers can get off scot-free.16
8. Id. at 128.
9. Id. at 144.
10. See id. at 127-28.
11. Id. at 128.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41 (Belknap Press 1963)
(1881)).
15. Id. at 135.
16. See id. at 133-35.
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So too, if fear of the "strategically heedless" explains why
Holmesians repudiate ignorance-as-excuse, Kahan makes clear that
the intentional head-burier is at most "a bit player in the mistake of
law drama."17 Kahan emphasizes this point through a close reading
of People v. Marrero, 18 in which a federal prison guard was prohib
ited from pleading his quite reasonable but mistaken belief that he
was a "peace officer" exempt from New York's concealed-weapons
law. While New York's highest court insisted that excusing
Marrero would encourage mistakes of law and depreciate the utility
of knowledge, Kahan insists that Marrero was far from heedless.
Rather than "deliberately shield[ ] himself from l�gal knowledge,"
Marrero "had tenaciously attempted to ferret it out."19 As for
other would-be head-buriers, Kahan continues, they hardly would
have been helped had Marrero's request for a reasonable-mistake
defense been accepted.20 Ultimately, therefore, Kahan is convinced
(and now so am I) that Marrero botches its stated intention of en
dorsing the utility of knowledge, not by denying a defense to the
strategically heedless, but by denying a defense to "the impudently
inquisitive" who pay "exacting attention to[ ] the law's fine
points."21
Kahan then deftly rehabilitates Marrero. Legal research per
formed by someone who is contemplating action of questionable
legality is far from an unalloyed good, Kahan tells us. Whether we
are talking about Marrero or a possessor of "designer" drugs, to
condition the excuse on reasonable efforts to learn the law is to
institutionalize "loopholing."22 For example, drug manufacturers
can avoid a jurisdiction's controlled-substances list simply by "al
ter[ing] the composition of . . . a substance slightly without changing
its pharmacological effects."23
One way to fix the inevitable incompleteness of statutory defini
tions of crime is to draft laws at a level of abstraction sufficient to
"remove offenders' temptation to look for loopholes ex ante by giv
ing courts the flexibility to adapt the law to innovative forms of
crime ex post. "24 This remedy for loopholing is what Kahan calls
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 131.

513 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987). See Kahan, supra note 1, at 131-37.
Kahan, supra note 1, at 133.

See id.
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 137-41.
23. Id. at 138.
24. Id. at 139.
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"prudent obfuscation."25 For it to work, Kahan posits, the law must
deny all forms of mistake-as-excuse, particularly the excuse for rea
sonable mistakes. Otherwise, he points out, deliberately complex
criminal laws would be thwarted by legal researchers whose efforts
to keep current often would be understandably de:ficient.26 Yet, as
Kahan asks, "[i]f the law aspires to be deliberately vague and com
plex, and if it tries to discourage rather than reward inquiry into the
fine points of law by punishing even reasonable mistakes, how can
it expect individuals who want to be law-abiding to know what their
legal duties are?"27
And so we arrive at the payoff of Kahan's essay: "legal moral
ism," a move he recommends to reward the diligent researcher at
once (but not the loopholer) and to punish the strategically heed
less. In a nutshell, legal moralism imposes strict liability on all
agents whose wrongs are immoral in a prelegal sense and punishes
all negligent agents whose wrongs are malum prohibitum, that is,
technically wrong, but not immoral in a prelegal sense. According
to Kahan we all know right from wrong,28 and so the law need not
excuse the ignorance of agents like Cleora King, whose sketchy
moral knowledge left her stashing drugs in a small foil package in
her underwear, only to argue later that Minnesota's banned-sub
stances list was too hard to keep up with.29 Even Marrero, as al
most-lawful as his conduct was, not only knew about "New York's
... strong antipathy toward, and fear of, handguns,"30 but he also, it
turns out, had 1) violated his employer's internal gun policy; 2) un
lawfully supplied others with guns; and 3) tried to pull a gun on the
police who approached him at the nightclub where he was
arrested. 31
Kahan's legal moralism is meant to chill more borderline-lawful
behavior than a negligence regime. This is a welcome result for
Kahan, since we gain nothing by excusing agents like King and
Marrero, who knew they were acting at best in a marginally legal
way. So for Kahan the question is not just whether we reasonably
believe in the lawfulness of our actions, but also whether those ac
tions are independently "morally blameworthy." Kahan would
Id. at 139-40.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 140.

25.

28.

See id.

29. See id. at 137-38, 140.
30. Id. at 141.
31. See id.
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have moral failings block the mistake-of-law defense, since it is
"commonplace" for us to "condemn someone for being inattentive
to moral obligations"32 "with which the law-abiders and law-break
ers alike are thoroughly familiar."33
THE FAMILIARITY OF LEGAL MORALISM
Kahan is certainly onto something, though it is an approach to
mistakes that is far from new. His "legal moralism" owes to an old
move known as the "lesser moral wrong"34 or "moral-wrong doc
trine,"35 though without attribution. An example of this doctrine is
the Victorian case Regina v. Prince. 36 There the Court upheld
Prince's conviction of absconding with a girl under sixteen without
parental approval, no matter how old the fourteen-year-old Annie
Phillips looked or said she was.37 The reason? Prince was simply
clearing the way for the immoral act of fornication, an act which
could be cleansed, if at all, only by parental permission.38 A half
century later, an Ohio court, relying on other decisions on point,
refused to hear a man accused of abandoning his pregnant wife
plead ignorance as to her pregnancy.39 Again, the court reasoned,
abandoning one's wife - pregnant or not - while rarely criminal,
is always immoral.40
Although this particular form of moralizing still pops up in ap
pellate opinions,41 it is, in fairness to Professor Kahan, anything but
popular.

No leading commentator who addresses it - Joshua

32. Id. at 144.
33. Id. at 140.
34. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, CruMlNAL LAW§ 5.1, at 410-12 (2d ed.
1986); see 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CruMlNAL LAW DEFENSES§ 62(c)(4), at 254-55 n.30 (1984 &
Supp. 1998) ("'lesser wrong' theory"); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and
the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 696 (1994) ("lesser-wrong
principle").
35. JosHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW§ 12.06[B], at 139-41 (2d ed.
1995); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CruMlNAL LAw: THE GENERAL PART§ 69, at 188-90 (2d ed.
1961).
36. 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875).
37. See Offenses against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Viet., ch. 100,§ 55. For co=en
tary on Prince, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Sepa
ration in Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625, 652-56 (1984); Martin R. Gardner, The Mens
Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993
UTAH L. REv. 635, 698-705; Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 19 VA. L. REv.
741, 788-92 (1993); Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II Honest but Unreason
able Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REv. 459, 469-70 (1987).
38. See Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. at 174 (Bramwell, J., concurring).
39. See White v. State, 185 N.E. 64, 65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933).
40. See White, 185 N.E. at 65.
t..1. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 668 P.2d 829, 833 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Garnett v. State, 632
A.2d 797, 813 (Md. 1993) (Bell, J., dissenting).
-
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Dressler,42 George Fletcher,43 Graham Hughes,44 Sanford Kadish,45
Wayne LaFave,46 Rollin Perkins,47 or Glanville Williams48 - ap
proves. Either they doubt the possibility of a modem community
ethic, or they reject this type of moralizing on legality, mens rea, or
other grounds. While I':i;n persuaded that Professor Kahan gets the
better of this disagreement - our pluralism rarely divides us on our
sense of what is good, or right, or true, or just - I wonder why he
does not acknowledge that we already consider lawful but immoral
acts relevant to a determination of whether other conduct is crimi
nal. Here I am not referring to the law of felony murder,49 to the
law of (some) conspiracies,50 or to law's willingness to foreclose on
the excuse of intoxication,51 each of which instantiates legal moral
ism. Rather, I refer to legal moralism already at work in the law of
mistake.
It is hombook law that some mistakes of fact can excuse otherwise criminal acts. To lift an example from J.L. Austin:
.
You have a donkey, so have I, and they graze in the same field. The
day comes when I conceive a dislike for mine. I go to shoot it, draw a
bead on it, fire: the beast falls in its tracks. I inspect the victim, and
find to my horror that it is your donkey. I appear on your doorstep
with the remains and say-what? 'I say, old sport, I'm awfully sorry,
&c., I've shot your donkey by accident?' Or 'by mistake'?52

Though Austin left the question open (and died before taking his
next step into criminal law after 'Excuses' and 'Ink'),53 I think it's
safe to say we're meant to take this as a case of mistake. By that I
mean that the shooter of the donkey was neither nudged nor care
less, but instead "was looking at the whole thing quite differ
ently."54 So, if mistakes are generally viewed as responsibility42. See DRESSLER, supra note 35, at 140-41.
43. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw§ 9.3.3, at 723-30 (1978).
44. See Graham Hughes, Criminal Responsibility, 16 STAN. L. REv. 470, 480·81 (1964).
45. See Kadish, supra note 34, at 695-96.
46. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 34, at 411-12.
47. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 698 (1957).
48. See WILLIAMS, supra note 35,§ 69, at 185-99.
49. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 189 (Deering 1997) (accidental killings deemed "mur
der" when act is otherwise felonious).
50. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.§ 1 {1988) (restraining trade is criminal only when by agreement);
CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 182{a)(5) (Deering 1997) (injury to "public health, to public morals, or
to pervert . . . justice" is criminal only when by agreement).
51. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 {1996).
52. J.L. AuSTIN, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 185 n.1 (J.O. Urmson &
G.J. Warnock eds., 3d ed. 1979).
53. See J.L. AUSTIN, Three Ways of Spilling Ink, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note
52, at 272.
54. AusTIN, supra note 52, at 176.
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evading accounts of actions and their outcomes, and they are, then
why aren't they uniformly so viewed?
The answer is that the law of mistake does not merely excuse
actions that were lawful from the agent's view of those actions and
their factual background. Whether mistakes are excusable also en
tails, as Kahan says it should, an assessment of the moral content of
the action. Take, for example, the California case People v. Lo
pez, 55 in which Lopez, charged with furnishing marijuana to a mi
nor, was estopped from complaining that he thought the minor was
an adult. But if Lopez's mistake was reasonable, why wouldn't the
appellate court let him litigate the question? Why wasn't Lopez's
crime really just attempted furnishing of marijuana to an adult? Be
cause of the linguistic stretch of calling a successful drug transaction
a failure? Unlikely. Rather, it is "legal moralism" at work in the
law of mistake. Accordingly, when five years earlier the California
Supreme Court recognized niistake as an excuse to charges of sex
with a minor,56 it was expressing a moral evaluation then shared
only by a minority of states: that sex between unmarried con
senting adults is not necessarily immoral.57
THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF KAHAN's ESSAY
As anyone even casually familiar with his impressive reuvre
would expect, Kahan's essay aspires to more than just mapping on
to mistakes of law this hoary, though erratically applied, lesser
legal-wrong approach to mistakes of fact. He seeks also to justify
why a lawful but immoral act should be relevant to a determination
of whether other conduct is criminal. Kahan's thesis is therefore
both very important and in my view right on: the unalterably moral
dimensions of criminal law should be confronted, not finessed.
Nonetheless, I'm not sure that he has altogether succeeded in
instructing us how to do that or more, specifically, in instructing us
what it is that gives a law its moral content. We know well the con
sequences of Kahan's theory - that violating a morally empty or
malum prohibitum law is excusable by a reasonable mistake of law,
55. 77 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); see also 1 CAL. JuRY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL)
§ 4.35 (West 1988); cf. MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 2.04(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (sug

gesting that mistake cannot excuse otherwise criminal acts, but in such instances, the grade of
offense is reduced to that which defendant thought he was committing).
56. See People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
57. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 232 n.10 (6th ed. 1995) (noting that mistake of age de
fense is not recognized in the majority of jurisdictions). For an update, see 1 ROBINSON,
supra note 34,§ 1 08(b).
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and that violating a law that is in some important sense moral, is
not. Evaluating whether a law is moral or not is not, however, part
of Kahan's project, although he is tough on legislatures who don't
make it part of theirs.ss
Kahan does stick his neck out a bit when, in discussing a recent
Supreme Court case, Cheek

v.

United States,59 he says that criminal

tax provisions don't "embod[y] moral norms that have an existence
independent of the law itself."6° For that reason, Kahan argues,
awareness of the duty to pay taxes is and should be a precondition
to criminal enforcement of tax laws.61 At the broadest level of gen
erality, he adds, we are morally culpable for not knowing we are
obliged to pay at least some taxes. And in this vein I think Kahan
would agree that, say, driving a car or practicing medicine without a
license, or draft-dodging, or contempt of court - despite their "de
rivative" or "artificial" nature62 - also demonstrates the moral fail
ing of being too far out of touch with law, even though none of
these actions is wrong in a prelegal sense. But, as Kahan notes, we
may be adequately in touch with law and still miss out on a range of
ticky-tack legal obligations.
To substantiate this point, Kahan alludes to the plight of Justice
Breyer, who before being elevated to the High Court got himself
into a pinch by not knowing that he was obliged to pay taxes on the
wages of his weekly maid.63 For Kahan, not knowing that a maid's
wages are taxable is neither morally equivalent nor even adjacent to
not knowing of the general duty to pay taxes. Because Kahan finds
the technical side of tax law - and banking law, broadcasting law,
and election law - to be without moral content,64 he sees nothing
wrong with allowing loopholing through mistake defenses there,
though not with otherwise morally empty laws that protect the pub
lic from "unusually high risks," as in the transportation of '"danger
ous or deleterious devices . . . or obnoxious waste materials."'65
58. See Kahan, supra note 1, at 151-54.
59. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
60. Kahan, supra note 1, at 146-47.
61. See id. at 145-49.
62. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARM TO
OTHERS 11, 19-21 (1984) ("One can wrongfully kill whether or not there is a criminal law of
homicide, but one cannot commit contempt of court unless there is already in existence a
complex legal structure (the court system) whose rules confer powers and immunities, and
define authority.").
63. See Kahan, supra note 1, at 147, 148 n.83.
64. See id. at 149.
65. Id. at 151 (quoting United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S.
558, 564-65 (1971). In his response to this correspondence, Professor Kahan suggests that, at
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It is one thing for Kahan to ask us to accept the law's malum in
se/malum prohibitum distinction - for him to, in essence, direct us
back to the lesser-moral-wrong theory of mistakes. But it is quite
another thing for him to instruct us on how to locate the moral
content, if any, in a statute. Kahan concedes that the line between
malum in se and malum prohibitum is "blurry."66 Normally I
would say that conceding as much in no way constitutes a weakness
in his position.67 After all, that some wrongs are difficult to classify
does not mean that we do not know what it means for a crime to be
malum in se or wrong in a prelegal sense. It means that we do: "we
could not recognize borderline cases of a concept as borderline
cases if we did not grasp the concept to begin with."68
But boundary cases here are so plentiful that even as early as
the malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction was said to
have "long since exploded."69 Even if the distinction is not entirely

1822

spurious, then surely it comes close, as a glance at the Supreme
Court's pertinent decisions betrays.70 Because reference to the ma
lum in se/malum prohibitum distinction cannot by itself recommend
Kahan's legal moralism, I wish that he had given comments like this
more explanation: "The willingness to abide by the judgments of
those institutions [legislatures, administrative agencies, courts],
while not an uncontested understanding of moral and civic virtue, is
nevertheless clearly recognizable as such."71 In saying so, Kahan
morally faults anyone who knowingly privileges his or her own be
lief system over his or her community's. But can one's failure to
observe those norms fully - knowingly or not
help but be a
-

moral failing? And oppositely, is not the successful integration of
the level of implementing legal moralism, assaulting a civilian is "equivalent" to assaulting a
federal officer. Compare Dan Kahan, Is Ignorance of Fact an Excuse Only for the Virtuous?,
96 MlcH. L. REv. 2123, 2123-24 & n.9 with George Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act
Approach to the Double Jeopardy Same Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1027, 1031 n.12
(1995) ("Perhaps a statute limited to killing the President would manifest significantly
greater blameworthiness than a generic murder statute. (The idea is Akhil Amar's.) I am
not sure I agree but, in any event, few jobs would be as unique and important as the Presi
dency."). I, contrariwise, cannot see the equivalency of the two actions. Rather, only the
greediest sense of equality would value the President's time or life equal to the rest of ours.
Yet it is precisely this type of moral claim that Kahan reco=ends, but for now has chosen to
bank, or at least leave open.
66. Kahan, supra note 1, at 151.
67. See, e.g., Daniel Yeager, Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity, CRIM. JuST.
ETHICS, Wmter/Spring 1996, at 25, 28.
68. JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH Acrs: AN EssAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 8
(1969).
69. Bensley v. Bignold, 106 Eng. Rep. 1214, 1216 (1822).
70. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (and cases cited therein).
71. Kahan, supra note 1, at 148-49.
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even the most hypertechnical norms into one's belief system itself a
moral accomplishment?
At one point Kahan observes that loopholers in areas that do
not implicate morality are "compensate[d]" and "honor[ed]," not
"condemn[ed]."72 He admits that his observation is contested, but
he doesn't tell us why it is not a moral failing not to condemn
loopholing in every instance. Indeed, I once heard tennis star John
McEnroe say on television that he pays more taxes than necessary.
While acknowledging that a shifty tax lawyer could save him a bun
dle, McEnroe declaimed that he'd rather not "cheat" the govern
ment by lawfully "bending" the laws.
Now that is moral, since McEnroe's commitment to law-abiding
ness evidently was in no sense motivated by fear of detection, ap
prehension, and punishment. Isn't it highly moral to have so fully
integrated law into one's belief system as to be given over to the
activity of ensuring law-abidingness - naturally with an exemption
from obedience to immoral "laws" such as those in force in Nazi
Germany?73

Perhaps Professor Kahan holds that question -

whether law abiding and law breaking, without more, are always
matters of morality - for another day.
Meanwhile, I'm not sure why someone so skilled at recognizing
and writing about the judicial veneering of morality in criminal law
would disqualify himself from staking out moral positions. Cer
tainly there must be a difference between taking moral positions
and moralizing, just as there must be a difference between exercis
ing judgment and expressing one's preferences. How else could we
get beyond the sort of skepticism that would prevent our taking
positions on, say, eating one's young or unanesthetized clito
ridectomy? Indeed, that Professor Kahan has over the past five or
so years so successfully "outed" the relevance of moral theory for
us in criminal law is something I not only acknowledge, but even
emulate.74 But after adumbrating a moral theory,75 Kahan's deci
sion to leave its operation to politics is to my mind a disappoint
ment, at least to the extent that his moral position is, ultimately, not
to take moral positions, at least not here.

72. Id. at 148.
73. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law
A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 {1958).
74. See, e.g., Daniel B. Yeager, Dangerous Games and the Criminal Law, CRIM. JUST,
ETHICS, Wmter/Spring 1997, at 3; Yeager, supra note 67.
7'?· See Kahan, supra note 65, at 2127.
-

